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This paper studies the health effects of one of the world’s largest demand-side financial 
incentive programmes – India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana. Our difference-in-difference 
estimates exploit heterogeneity in the timing of the introduction of the financial incentive 
programme across districts. We find that cash incentives to women increased access to 
maternity services but failed to improve neonatal or early neonatal mortality, even in 
districts with relatively high quality of care. The positive effects on utilisation are larger 
for less educated, poorer, and ethnically marginalised women. We also find evidence of 
unintended consequences. The financial incentive programme was associated with a 
substitution away from private health providers, an increase in fertility and a positive 
improvement in breastfeeding behaviour. These findings demonstrate the potential for 
financial incentives to have unanticipated health effects, which may, in the case of 
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One of the main challenges for global health is to identify policies and strategies that 
improve the health of women and children (United Nations, 2010). The traditional focus 
of much of the medical literature has been on intervention research resulting in 
unprecedented knowledge on what health technologies work (Bhutta et al., 2008; 
Campbell and Graham, 2006; Jones et al., 2003). Never before have policymakers in 
developing countries had such a wealth of evidence at their disposal. Indeed, countries 
that achieved universal coverage of life-saving interventions have seen rapid reductions in 
mortality. For example, over the past two decades Thailand, Vietnam and Sri Lanka have 
developed a comprehensive primary health care system. All these countries between 1990 
and 2006 witnessed average yearly reductions in under five mortality of over 5 percent 
(Rohde et al., 2008). Yet across the developing world more broadly there are large gaps 
in coverage, particularly amongst the poorest (Bhutta et al., 2010). A key question then is 
whether there are policies that can be introduced within health systems – termed here 
health system interventions – which can be shown to improve access to priority health 
services. 
 
In an effort to improve population coverage of health interventions and narrow the 
differences between income groups, policymakers in developing countries are becoming 
increasingly bold in their reforms. One promising strategy is to provide financial 
incentives to individuals who exhibit certain behaviours that improve health.
2
 This is the 
key feature of various programmes that have become popular in recent years. Whether the 
incentive takes the form of conditional cash transfers, vouchers or one-off cash payments, 
the central idea of providing monetary rewards conditional on measurable actions is the 
same. Financial incentives have courted considerable controversial, with views ranging 
from “as close as you can come to a magic bullet” to a “form of bribery” (Dugger, 2004; 
Marteau et al., 2009). Critics point to the theoretical possibility of unintended adverse 
consequences as well as moral concerns over their use, particularly in a health setting. 
 
This paper studies the effects of one of the largest cash incentive programmes for health 
in the world. With an annual expenditure of 8.8 billion rupees or $207 million, and an 
estimated 7.1 million individual beneficiaries,
3
 India’s national Janani Suraksha Yojana 
(JSY) provides cash to women who give birth in a health facility. The JSY provides an 
ideal testing ground to examine the effects of financial incentives on health.
4
 Although 
                                                     
2 In this paper we are interested in demand-side financial incentives, rather than provider payment 
mechanisms such as pay-for-performance. These reward physicians for improvements in quality of care and 
other measures, and are popular in the US and UK. For brevity, we will use the term financial or cash 
incentives in health to refer to schemes that target the users of health care. 
3 These figures refer to 2007/08, the financial year closest to our study period.  
4 There have been a number of studies on the JSY, some of which have collected primary household data 
(Devadasan et al., 2008; Malini et al., 2008; Verma et al., 2010). For the most part these have been 
descriptive, documenting progress in the implementation of the programme. By contrast, Lim and colleagues 
(2010) make claims as to the causal effect of the JSY. The headline results are based on two specifications 
that fail to convincingly control for unobserved heterogeneity. The first performs individual matching on a 
cross-section of women who did and did not receive the JSY cash, interpreting the difference between the two 
groups as the causal effect. Not only is there reverse causality (women receive the cash when they give birth 
in a health facility), but conditional independence is a strong assumption and unobservsables are likely to bias 
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officially launched in 2005, the rollout of the JSY across districts was incremental, 
providing variation in its placement. At the same time, much of the health policy 
environment in India is common within states, which gives us more confidence that 
district placement of the JSY is not acting as a proxy for other policy initiatives. A second 
advantage of this setting is the narrow focus of the JSY on women at childbirth. This 
provides greater scope for examining unintended consequences of the financial incentives 
on closely related but non-incentivised behaviours. A third advantage is the scale at 
which the JSY was implemented. This differentiates our study from carefully controlled 
small scale (incentive) experiments, whose external validity has at times been questioned 
(Deaton, 2010).   
 
We identify the effect of the JSY on health care seeking behaviour and health status by 
exploiting variation in the timing of the introduction of the JSY to districts. From 2005 
onwards, the JSY was introduced to 424 of the 587 sample districts, staggered over a 
three-year period. Using data on women who gave birth between 2001 and 2008 from the 
two most recent rounds of India’s District Level Health Survey (DLHS), our empirical 
approach examines whether the JSY can account for cross-district patterns in health care 
utilisation and health status over time. In estimating the effect of the JSY, this difference-
in-difference strategy allows us to control for time invariant unobservables at the district 
level that influence study outcomes and are correlated with the placement of the JSY.  
 
Our results show that the JSY increases the proportion of women who give birth in a 
public health facility. The magnitude of this effect is quite large – when implemented at 
full coverage, the JSY leads to a 19 percentage point increase or a doubling in the rate of 
utilisation. Incomplete implementation, however, means that the increase in utilisation 
due to the JSY is in practice substantially smaller. The positive impact on women giving 
birth in a public health facility is driven almost entirely by increases in the use of primary 
health centres and community health centres, providers that operate below the district 
hospital. This may explain why we see no impact of the JSY on the rate of caesarean 
section. In addition, we present evidence on the effect of the JSY on health outcomes, 
finding no statistically significant effect on either neonatal mortality (deaths within 28 
days of birth) or early neonatal mortality (deaths within 24 hours of birth). Our preferred 
point estimate is able to rule out negative effects on early neonatal mortality larger than 
8.7 deaths per 1,000 live births. An important limitation of the study is that, for lack of 
suitable data, we were unable to assess the effect of the JSY on maternal mortality.  
 
Since the JSY was not randomly assigned, the central empirical concern is whether the 
introduction of the JSY is correlated with unobserved changes in the determinants of 
women’s behaviour at childbirth. In support of our identifying assumption we find that, 
first, the JSY has little or no effect on antenatal care, a placebo outcome that was not 
explicitly incentivised by the programme; second, study outcomes are not correlated with 
future introduction of the JSY – ie. changes in the outcomes of interest do not anticipate 
JSY placement; and third, the within-district variation over time in JSY coverage that 
                                                                                                                                                 
the results (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). The second approach is similar to a before and after design 
except that the treatment group comprises only JSY beneficiaries in the second time period. 
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identifies the effect of the programme is not correlated with a broad range of individual 
characteristics that strongly influence care seeking behaviour.  
 
We also provide evidence on a number of unintended consequences. First, failure to 
implement the JSY much beyond the public sector means that the financial incentives 
result in women substituting away from giving birth in the private sector. Point estimates 
suggest that this substitution effect accounts for approximately one-third of the positive 
impact of the JSY on public health facility births. Second, results show that the JSY has a 
positive, statistically significant effect on fertility. Third, we find evidence of indirect 
benefits. Women in JSY districts are more likely to start early breastfeeding within one 
hour of childbirth. Our final set of results concerns heterogeneity in the effect of the JSY. 
We examine a number of socioeconomic characteristics – mother’s education, ethnicity 
and wealth – that may modify the effect on utilisation, with results showing a greater 
behavioural response amongst women who are more disadvantaged. When we use data 
from a survey of health providers to generate a proxy measure of quality of care, we find 
that there is no differential effect of the JSY on mortality with respect to structural quality 
of care. 
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by estimating robust causal effects that 
lead to conclusions which are qualitatively different from previous studies on the JSY. 
Our main results are consistent with much of the evidence emerging from conditional 
cash transfer programmes and small scale incentive experiments.
5
 However, we go 
beyond the typical study of financial incentives in several ways. First, we examine 
unintended consequences of financial incentives. Similar to the findings from studies in 
Brazil (Morris et al., 2004b) and Honduras (Morris et al., 2004a), we document evidence 
of adverse effects, which highlight how important it is for policymakers to anticipate 
these downside risks in the design of financial incentive schemes. Second, our empirical 
strategy allows us to identify what we refer to as an implementation gap – that is, the 
difference between the (intent-to-treat) effect of introducing the JSY programme in a 
district and the effect of the financial incentives as the mechanism within the JSY.  
 
We also connect to a second literature evaluating the impact of health system 
interventions and policies. This is a wide ranging and challenging area of research (Mills 
et al., 2008), and one in which much of the existing econometric evidence focuses on the 
impact of health financing initiatives, in particular health insurance (eg. Babiarz et al., 
2010; Finkelstein et al., 2011; King et al., 2009; Manning et al., 1987; Thornton et al., 
2010; Wagstaff et al., 2009). Other areas of health system policy that have been 
addressed in the econometric literature include the removal of user fees (eg. Ansah et al., 
2009), pay-for-performance (eg. Basinga et al., 2011; Farrar et al., 2009), competition 
(eg. Cooper et al., 2011; Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Propper et al., 2008), pay 
regulation (eg. Propper and Van Reenen, 2010), and targets (eg. Propper et al., 2010).   
 
                                                     
5 The systematic literature review on conditional cash transfers provides a detailed summary of much of this 
evidence (Lagarde et al., 2007).  
5 
 
Given that the JSY remains a high-profile federal health programme in India, the findings 
are of immediate relevance to policy. First, they argue for much better administration of 
the programme. If disbursement of the JSY cash were improved, the effect on use of 
formal health care would be substantially greater than at present. Second, the findings 
reinforce the growing sentiment that demand-side intervention by government can be 
effective in improving access to health services but alone may be insufficient to improve 
health outcomes. Strengthening the quality of primary health care and the referral system 
in India is thus a critical complementary strategy, as is staggering supply- and demand-
side investments over time such that individuals are encouraged to use services once 
quality has improved. Third, the findings suggest that financial incentives may be a 
powerful but imprecise tool for changing health-related behaviours. They can have 
unintended health effects, on fertility for example, which may undermine the 
programme’s own objectives. Financial incentives must therefore be used with caution.6  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the JSY and sets out theoretical 
predictions of its impact on health-related behaviours. Section III describes the data. 
Section IV presents the empirical strategy and reduced-form estimates. Section V 
presents the main econometric results and includes a discussion of robustness checks. 
Section VI examines heterogeneity in the impact of the JSY, and Section VII offers 
concluding comments.  
  
                                                     
6 Of immediate relevance is the Government of India has plan to introduce a new cash transfer scheme for 




In the early 1990s, maternal and child health in India gained greater policy recognition 
with the launch of the Child Survival and Safe Motherhood programme. In line with 
international policy at the time, articulated in the International Conference on Population 
and Development in Cairo, this represented a paradigm shift from an historical focus on 
family planning to broader issues around reproductive health and safe motherhood. One 
particularly relevant initiative in the 1990s was the National Maternal Benefit Scheme, an 
unconditional cash transfer targeted at pregnant women living in households below the 
poverty line. This scheme laid the foundation of what was later to become the JSY. 
 
Despite the long history of well-intentioned family welfare policies and some recent 
progress, maternal and child mortality in India remains high. With 68,000 maternal 
deaths and 1.5 million deaths among children under five every year, no other country 
accounts for a larger proportion of global mortality (Paul et al., 2011). Maternal mortality 
has fallen by 47 percent from 398 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1997-98 to 212 deaths 
per 100,000 live births in 2007-09 (Registrar General of India, 2006; Registrar General of 
India, 2011). Meanwhile, under-five mortality has also improved, from 109 deaths per 
1,000 live births in 1992-93 to 74 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2005-06 (International 
Institute for Population Sciences and Macro International, 2007) and neonatal mortality 
currently stands at 35 deaths per 1,000 live births (Registrar General of India, 2009). 
Nonetheless, these trends are not sufficient for India to meet its international health 
targets in 2015. In addition, the national picture masks enormous differences across 
states. For example, Kerala’s maternal mortality rate is almost five times lower than some 
of the worst performing northern Indian states (Registrar General of India, 2011).  
 
The emerging consensus around strategies to address maternal mortality prioritises one 
based on delivery in primary health care institutions, backed up by access to referral-level 
facilities (Campbell and Graham, 2006). In India, national surveys show that institutional 
deliveries have increased modestly, from 26 percent in 1993 to 39 percent in 2006 
(International Institute for Population Sciences, 1995; International Institute for 
Population Sciences and Macro International, 2007), but a large proportion of women 
continue to give birth at home. Even when women do reach a health facility to give birth, 
the quality of care they receive is unlikely to be adequate (Das and Hammer, 2006; Das 
and Hammer, 2007; Das et al., 2008). For example, only 53 percent of primary health 
centres in India function 24 hours a day and 45 percent do not have referral services for 
complicated deliveries (International Institute for Population Sciences, 2010). Absent 
health workers is also a common phenomenon (Banerjee et al., 2004). 
 
It is against this background that the federal government launched in 2005 the National 
Rural Health Mission (NRHM), a centrally funded programme to integrate what had 
previously been a fragmented set of mostly disease focused initiatives. While broad in its 
scope, the central focus of the NRHM is maternal and child health. Key elements of the 
mission include large investments in health infrastructure, the deployment of three 
quarters of a million newly created accredited social health activists as frontline health 
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workers in the community, strategies to stimulate demand for health services, and 
decentralisation of the health system (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2005). 
 
 
II.A India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana 
One of the more high profile components of the NRHM is the Janani Suraksha Yojana 
(translated as “Safe Motherhood Scheme”). It was launched officially in April 2005, with 
the objective of improving maternal and neonatal health through the promotion of 
institutional deliveries.
7
 It provides a cash incentive to women who give birth in a public 
health facility or an accredited private health provider (Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare, 2006).  
 
The JSY programme designates Indian states as low performing or high performing, 
varying the cash amount to provide greater incentives in the area of higher priority. 
Specifically, women in low-performing states are offered 1,400 Rs ($31) in rural areas 
and 1,000 Rs ($22) in urban areas, and those in high-performing states are given 700 Rs 
($16) in rural areas and 600 Rs ($13) in urban areas.
8
 To put these amounts in 
perspective, Gross National Income per capita was $1000 in 2007. The cash payment is 
available to all women in the low-performing states; by contrast, it is offered in high-
performing states only to women living in households below the poverty line, belonging 
to scheduled castes and tribes, or those who have had two or fewer live births. The policy 
stipulates that the cash is to be disbursed to the mother immediately at the institution 
itself and within a week of delivery. 
 
To provide incentives for health workers who encourage women to give birth in a formal 
care provider, accredited social health workers are offered a cash payment of between 
200 Rs ($4) and 600 Rs ($13) for each delivery attended. The JSY also pays 500 Rs ($11) 
to women who give birth at home, conditional on less than two living children and a 
below the poverty line card. Since this is a direct continuation of the cash assistance 
provided under the National Maternity Benefit Scheme, the JSY introduces no additional 
incentive for eligible women to stay at home. 
 
The JSY is one of a number of different types of financial incentive programmes that 
have become popular in developing countries during the 2000s. Perhaps the most widely 
adopted are conditional cash transfer programmes, designed to act as a social safety net 
for the poor while at the same time inducing greater investment in human capital 
                                                     
7 Ethnographic research in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh casts doubt on the government strategy to 
encourage institutional deliveries as a means to improve the health of women. Jeffrey and Jeffrey (2010) 
argue that the context surrounding the government provision of health care presents challenges that neither 
the NRHM nor the JSY were intended to address. Decades of mistrust of government health services and 
controversial family planning programmes have left a credibility gap not easily filled by offering financial 
incentives and investing in new infrastructure. In line with a report by Human Rights Watch (2009), they 
contend that accountability of government health providers to the population they serve is key and nothing 
less than “a dismantling of a long-standing political economy of health care provision” will help to remedy 
the situation. 
8 The low-performing states consist of Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, 
Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Assam and Jammu and Kashmir. 
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(Fiszbein et al., 2008).
9
 Financial incentive schemes that focus on specific health 
problems or health services have also emerged. These tend to provide one-off cash 
payments, vouchers, or in-kind transfers linked to specific services, such as maternity 
services (Nepal), insecticide treated nets (Tanzania), HIV testing (Malawi), immunization 
(Indian state of Rajasthan), and reproductive health and family planning services 
(Cambodia, Bangladesh, Kenya).  
 
 
II.B Theoretical Considerations 
Consider a financial incentive programme that rewards families in which the woman 
gives birth in a health facility. If households lack the financial resources, heavily discount 
the future or lack information on the benefits of health care to make optimal care seeking 
choices, short-term financial incentives will increase demand for maternal health care. 
For simplicity, suppose that there are three health seeking choices at delivery – public 
health providers, private health providers and giving birth at home. Financial incentives 
provided to women seeking care in the public sector only will then lead to a substitution 
away from private health providers and home births (Gertler and Van der Gaag, 1990).  
 
To the extent that health providers can meet this increase in demand, financial incentives 
will increase utilisation of health services. If instead health providers are functioning at 
full capacity or are unable to increase supply in the short-term, financial incentives will 
have little impact. Theoretically, negative outcomes may be generated when incentives 
crowd out intrinsic motivation. However, we consider such a mechanism unlikely in the 
context of an incentive scheme targeting care seeking behaviour. Whether an increase in 
utilisation of public health services improves health outcomes is not clear-cut, and will 
depend on differences in the clinical quality of care between the three health care seeking 
choices. We would expect the narrowest difference in quality to be between public and 
private health providers, particularly in terms of clinical as opposed to interpersonal 
dimensions quality. 
 
While the financial rewards provide explicit incentives to use maternal health services, 
implicitly they also serve to incentivise pregnancy. This effect may manifest itself in 
terms of a reduction in birth spacing or an increase in total lifetime children for women 
who otherwise would not have become pregnant. We also anticipate indirect effects as 
financial incentives increase women’s exposure to health information. Greater contact 
with health staff exposes women to more information on healthy behaviours concerning 
the mother and her neonate. Behaviors shown to have an impact on health outcomes 
include wrapping the baby within 30 minutes of childbirth, initiating breastfeeding within 
one hour, and dressing the cord with antiseptic (Darmstadt et al., 2005). 
  
                                                     
9 Some of better known CCT programmes Opportunidades in Mexico, Red De Proteccion Social in 
Nicaragua, the Bolsa Familia in Brazil, Familias en Acción in Colombia, Programa de Asignacion Familiar 




III. Measures and Data 
III.A Study Outcomes 
Data on the study outcomes come from the household component of the District Level 
Health Survey (DLHS), a repeated cross-section survey carried out by the International 
Institute for Population Sciences in Mumbai and designed to provide estimates on 
maternal and child health and service utilisation at the district level in India (International 
Institute for Population Sciences, 2010). The household survey used a multi-stage 
stratified random sampling design. We use data from the two most recent rounds of the 
household survey. The DLHS-2, conducted over the period 2002-04, sampled 620,107 
households in 593 districts. The DLHS-3, the most recent round, was carried out in 2007-
08 and sampled 720,320 households in 611 districts. Each married woman aged 15-49 
years in the sample households was interviewed and it is these data we use to construct 
our outcome measures (the sample size is 507,622 currently married women in DLHS-2 
and 643,944 currently married women in DLHS-3).  
 
The married woman questionnaire, modelled closely on India’s established National 
Family and Health Survey, contains measures of health care utilisation and health status 
that the JSY would be expected to improve. Our main utilisation outcome is births in a 
health facility, measured using information on the place of delivery of the woman’s most 
recent birth. The analysis also considers variants on this outcome, such as the type of 
health provider chosen, whether a health worker was in attendance and the type of 
procedure performed at delivery.  
 
Our main measure of health status is neonatal mortality, defined as the death of a baby 
within 28 days after being born alive and measured using information on the birth history 
of women.
10
 The financial year of the most recent delivery and each live birth is 
established using information on the year and month reported by women.
11
 The DLHS-3 
limits the recall period of birth histories to 1
st
 January 2004, while those in DLHS-2 are 
not truncated. However, to ensure recall periods are approximately the same in the two 
survey rounds, we drop all observations prior to 1
st
 April 2001. Thus, when we stack the 
data from the two survey rounds, we have observations in every financial year from 
2001/02 to 2007/08.  
 
An important contribution of this paper is to consider the effect of the JSY on a second 
set of outcomes that we refer to as unintended consequences of the programme. These 
include births in a private health facility, fertility, and breastfeeding behaviour. Private 
health facilities refer to both for-profit and not-for-profit nonstate providers. Fertility is 
measured using birth histories to establish whether women were pregnant in a given year. 
Finally, to measure breastfeeding, women were asked if and when they started 
breastfeeding the child of their most recent delivery. We focus on breastfeeding within 
                                                     
10 Unless truncated, a birth history documents every pregnancy a woman has had during her lifetime. It 
typically includes the pregnancy outcome, sex of the child, birth order, month and year of childbirth / 
abortion, age of woman at childbirth and, if the child died, age at death. 
11 We work in financial years (1st April to 31st March) throughout because the government’s annual budgetary 
cycle is likely to correspond more closely to the introduction of the JSY than calendar years. 
10 
 
the first hour, when information from health providers on the benefits of timely 
breastfeeding is most likely to take effect. All outcomes in this study are comparable 
across the two survey rounds, both in terms of how they are defined and the interview 
questions used to elicit the required information.  
 
Summary statistics on the outcome measures are shown in Panel A of Table 1. Across the 
two datasets, neonatal mortality is estimated to be 30 deaths per 1,000 live births. Around 
two-fifths of women give birth in a health facility (the remainder give birth at home), 
with the public and private sectors catering for approximately equal shares. Almost 8 
percent of women give birth by caesarean section and a further 2 percent have an assisted 
delivery.
12
 Two fifths of women have the three antenatal care visits recommended by the 
Government of India and approximately the same proportion start breastfeeding within 
one hour of giving birth. The proportion of women who report being pregnant in any 
given year is 8 percent. In addition to information on study outcomes, we exploit data on 
a broad range of socio-demographic characteristics. We again include in the analysis only 
those variables whose measurement is comparable across survey rounds. Panel B in Table 
1 provides summary statistics for these demographic variables.  
 
The data contain a district identifier which we use to estimate specifications with district 
fixed effects. However, because the administrative boundaries of some districts changed 
in the period between the two survey rounds, we sought to map new districts in the 
DLHS-3 onto their old counterparts in the DLHS-2 data. In most cases this was possible, 
leaving 587districts that are consistently defined across the two datasets.
13
 In estimating 
the effect of the JSY on care seeking behaviour and health status, we must assume that 
the district in which women are residing at the time of interview is the same as the one 
when she gave birth.  
 
 
III.B Placement of the JSY  
Our estimation strategy rests on there being variation in the timing of the introduction of 
the JSY. We exploit such variation at the district level, the administrative unit directly 
below the Indian state which has responsibility for planning and implementation of 
federal and state policies. Conceptually we wish to make the distinction between the 
introduction of the JSY and its coverage or penetration. The former reflects a decision on 
the part of the government health authorities to make the JSY available while the latter 
implies something about the quality of implementation. As we argue below, using data on 
both to evaluate the JSY provides for a richer interpretation of the estimates of effect.  
 
To construct our dummy for whether a district introduced the JSY in a given year, we use 
household data from the DLHS-3 in which women who gave birth are asked to respond to 
the following question: “Did you receive any government financial assistance for delivery 
care under the Janani Suraksha Yojana or state-specific scheme.” One way to proceed 
                                                     
12 An assisted delivery is defined as one which involves the use of forceps or a ventouse. 
13 In cases where the geographical boundaries of newly created districts cut across two or more old districts, 
we were unable to map the new districts onto their old counterparts. We therefore drop observations in which 
it is not possible to generate a consistent district identifier.    
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would be to define the year the JSY was introduced in a district as the first (birth) year in 
which a positive response was given to this question. But, due to imprecise wording, this 
question picks up responses that refer to the National Maternity Benefit Scheme, an 
initiative that preceded the JSY (see Section II for more detail). This explains why 7.4 
percent of women giving birth in a health facility report receiving a cash payment in 
2004/05, before the JSY was even official government policy. Instead we define the year 
the JSY was introduced in a given district to be the first year in which the proportion of 





We assess the reliability of this measure against an alternative that is based on data from 
an independent source. Conducted in parallel to the DLHS-3, a survey of health providers 
in the public sector sampled 8,619 primary health centres, who were asked if they had 
provided cash to JSY beneficiaries in the month preceding the interview. Using these 
data, we define a district as having started the JSY if at least one primary health centre 
reports disbursement of the cash payment to one or more JSY beneficiaries in the 
previous month. Because the reference periods of the two measures do not precisely 
match we confine the comparison to the set of districts that, according to our primary 
measure, had introduced the JSY by 2007/08.
15
 We find that there is agreement between 
the two measures in 97.5 percent of these districts.  
 
Figure 1 depicts on a map of India the year in which each district introduced the JSY, 
showing variation over time and between districts. According to our measure, 157 
districts first introduced the JSY in financial year 2005/06, a further 156 districts had 
introduced the JSY by 2006/07, and 111 more districts had started the JSY by 2007/08. In 
total, 424 started the programme and 163 districts did not start the programme during this 
study period. In anticipation of the empirical analysis, we recognise that variation in the 
introduction of the JSY across districts is unlikely to be random. Thus, understanding the 
determinants that are correlated with both the introduction of the JSY and the study 
outcomes is key to making a causal interpretation of the impact estimates.   
 
Discussions with policymakers and other stakeholders engaged with the JSY suggest that 
the introduction of the programme was prioritised in socioeconomically disadvantaged 
places. At the national level, the JSY was explicitly prioritised according to high-focus 
and low-focus states. More importantly, however, interviews indicated that the JSY was 
prioritised within states at the district level. For example, in the state of West Bengal, 
health sector reforms including the JSY gave particular attention to six focal districts, 
identified on the basis of health indicators, poverty and socially marginalised population 
groups.
16
   
                                                     
14 We base our measure of JSY placement on beneficiaries rather than, say, budget releases or district 
expenditure because a district with JSY beneficiaries implies that the government has taken the necessary 
steps to start the programme.  
15 This alternative measure corresponds to around the start of the financial year 2008/09 when these health 
providers were interviewed. In contrast, our main measure applies to the financial year 2007/08 and it is 
highly likely some districts introduced the JSY in the intervening period.  





Empirically we can examine the relationship between JSY placement and the latter two 
variables. The data support the qualitative evidence in showing the role of these district 
characteristics in influencing the decision on where to introduce the JSY. In districts with 
the JSY, poverty is 46 percent higher and the tribal population share is 26 percent larger. 
Although income was not mentioned, we also find that average wealth is 40 percent 
lower than non JSY districts. When we run a district-level regression of JSY placement 
on poverty incidence, the tribal population share and average household wealth, the 
bivariate relationships show the same pattern. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the 
results, showing that the three variables of interest are strong predictors of JSY placement 
and broadly this remains true when we focus on the introduction of the JSY in 2005 only.  
 
These results do not rule out the presence of other important factors that drive both the 
introduction of the JSY and changes in the study outcomes. To address this concern, in 
Section V we will show evidence in support of the identifying assumption that 
introduction of the JSY is orthogonal to the error term. First, there is little evidence of 
differential pre-existing trends in our outcomes – that is, changes in the outcomes of 
interest do not anticipate the introduction of the JSY. Second, once we control for district 
poverty, wealth and tribal population, we show that the remaining variation in the timing 
of the JSY introduction is not systematically related to observables at the individual level. 
These pieces of evidence are only suggestive and it is by definition impossible to test the 
identifying assumption. We urge the reader to interpret our findings with this important 
caveat in mind. 
 
 
III.C JSY Coverage  
We will also use data on the extent to which the JSY was implemented within a district 
such that our impact estimates capture the magnitude of the behavioural response to the 
incentives. If the financial incentives of the JSY are to bite, households should be 
exposed to information about the programme
17
 and financial incentives should reach 
eligible women. Data on the latter provide the basis for our measure of JSY penetration. 
Specifically, we will use the term JSY coverage to refer to the proportion of women 
giving birth in a public health facility who received the financial incentive.
18
 Full 
coverage thus implies every woman giving birth in a public health facility receives the 
financial incentive. 
 
The data show considerable variation in JSY coverage across districts. Figure 2 maps by 
district the average coverage of the JSY over the period 2005/06-2007/08. Of the 587 
districts for which we have data, JSY coverage is less than 10 percent in 114 districts and 
more than 40 percent in 188 districts. As expected, JSY coverage at the end of the study 
                                                     
17 A study carried out in 2008 in the high-focus states of Bihar, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and 
Rajasthan found that four-fifths of women were aware of the scheme and almost half of women giving birth 
in a health facility received the JSY cash (UNFPA, 2009). 
18 While the JSY is not limited to the public sector, our measure of coverage considers only public sector 
recipients of the financial incentive because only some nonstate health providers – in contrast to all health 
providers in the public sector – were accredited and able to participate in the JSY. 
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period is higher in those districts which started the programme earlier. For example, 
coverage in 2007/08 is 55 percent in districts that first introduced the JSY in 2005/06, 




IV. Empirical Strategy 
IV.A Identification of Impacts 
We use a difference-in-difference approach to identify the impact of the JSY on our study 
outcomes. A simple way to implement this strategy would be to compare changes over 
time in health care utilisation and health status for districts that introduce the JSY relative 
to those districts that do not. More precisely, we would run a regression of each outcome 
on a dummy for whether the district introduced the JSY, controlling for year and district 
fixed effects. The fixed effects would absorb variation due to common temporal shocks 
and time-invariant district factors. The remaining cross-district variation in the evolution 
of the outcome would identify the parameter on the JSY treatment indicator.  
 
In one sense, interpretation of this coefficient is straightforward and one that would 
appeal to policymakers – for it reveals the (intent-to-treat) effect of introducing the JSY 
on the study outcomes.
19
 It is useful as an historical record or audit of the success of the 
JSY during the period 2005-2008. On the other hand, interpretation is obscured by the 
fact that a given effect of introducing the JSY could reflect a large behavioural response 
to the financial incentives if within-district programme coverage was low or a smaller 
effect if implementation was more complete. The interpretation thus depends critically on 
the extent of implementation within districts.  
 
To make the magnitudes of the impact parameters more directly interpretable, we use 
information on the coverage of the intervention and an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach to scale our estimates.
20
 More precisely, we include JSY coverage in the right 
hand side and instrument for it using our indicator for when the JSY was first introduced. 
In this way, the model is identified by variation in the timing of the introduction of the 
JSY but the impact parameter is interpreted as the effect of the JSY at full coverage. If 
instead the model were identified purely by variation in JSY coverage, there would be 
legitimate concerns as to whether the regression estimates are consistent. Districts with 
higher JSY coverage are also those that are likely to implement effectively other health 
programmes. District-level unobservables, such as management and the capacity of 
district health authorities, may therefore generate a spurious relationship between the 
study outcomes and coverage of the JSY.  Pursuing an IV strategy not only improves 
interpretation but also addresses the potential problem of measurement error in JSY 
coverage that arises due to the imprecise wording of the particular question in the DLHS-
3 questionnaire. 
 
Formally, let      denote our outcome, a binary measure of service utilisation or health 
status for observation   in district   in year  . Let       denote our measure of programme 
coverage in district   in year  . Consider the equation: 
 
                                                     
19 For this reason we do report these results as the reduced-form second-stage estimates of the effect of our 
instrument, the introduction of the JSY, on the main study outcomes. 
20 Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) use a similar approach to scale their estimates of effect of television on 
adolescent test scores.  
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                                        ,  (1) 
 
where    and    are district and year fixed effects respectively;      is a vector of 
individual demographic characteristics including education of the mother, education of 
the husband, maternal age, a household wealth asset score and dummies for (categories 
of) urban residence, religion, ethnicity, and parity; and    is a vector of district-level 
characteristics which we discuss in more detail below. We cluster our standard errors by 
district to deal with concerns of serial correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004).  
 
To address several sources of endogeneity in the timing of the introduction of the JSY in 
a district, we include interactions between the year of birth and the share of the district 
population below the poverty line, the tribal population share, and the district mean of the 
household wealth asset score, represented by the term     . Discussions with 
stakeholders and our reading of the policy literature on the JSY suggest these district 
characteristics were influential in the decision on where to first introduce the JSY. Data 
used to generate these district-level variables come from the DLHS-3,
21
 which means we 
are controlling for differential trends based on 2008 values rather than actual trends.  
 
We estimate equation (1) by two-stage least squares (2SLS) and instrument for       with 
the dummy for whether the district had introduced the JSY in year  . The first-stage 
equation takes the form: 
 
                                           ,  (2) 
 
where         indicates whether district   had introduced the JSY in year  . It is 
variation in the instrument that identifies the effect of JSY coverage on the outcomes of 
interest. The identifying assumption underlying the analysis is that health care utilisation 
and health status in districts that introduced the JSY would not in the programme’s 
absence have changed differently from those that did not introduce the JSY. We provide 
evidence on the plausibility of this identifying assumption later on in Section V. When 
        is orthogonal to the error term in equation (1), then the impact parameter    is 
the causal effect of the JSY when implemented at full coverage on study outcomes. We 
interpret the 2SLS estimates as a local average treatment effect or LATE (Imbens and 
Angrist, 1994). They are, in other words, local to the women whose exposure to the 
financial incentives was influenced by the introduction of the JSY. In essence, this impact 
parameter “filters out” implementation, isolating the effect of the financial incentives as 
the mechanism within the JSY.  
 
As is clear from equation (1), we run regressions of each outcome using individual level 
data to make the most of the rich micro dataset at our disposal. This allows us to include 
controls for a range of individual demographic characteristics that might affect health 
                                                     
21 Our measure of poverty is constructed using information relating to the government system of identifying 
poor households. Specifically, it is based on responses to the question: “Does this household have a below the 
poverty line (BPL) card?” Because we are interested in controlling for sources of endogeneity that arise from 
government decision making processes, this poverty measure – rather than one measured perhaps more 
reliably in terms of household consumption – is particularly appropriate for our purposes.  
16 
 
care utilisation and health status. The model could be estimated using data aggregated at 
the district level and indeed when we do this the analysis generates estimates of impact 
that are almost identical to those reported in the paper, albeit with larger standard errors 
(results available from authors). In using individual level data, we note that the unit of 
observation differs according to the outcome. Each observation is a delivery (the most 
recent only) in the utilisation equations, and a live birth in the mortality equations.  
 
IV.B First Stage and Reduced-Form Results 
Table 2 presents in column (1) the first stage results in which we regress JSY coverage on 
the dummy for whether the district introduced the JSY. As expected, the results show that 
introducing the JSY has a strong positive effect of 26 percentage points on the coverage 
of the JSY within a district. In other words, introducing the JSY in a district increases the 
proportion of births in a public health facility for which women receive the cash 
incentive. The coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and the 
F-statistic on the instrument is sufficiently strong to avoid bias due to weak instruments 
(Stock et al., 2002). Note also that the mean of JSY coverage before the programme was 
introduced in districts is greater than zero, capturing cash payments made under the 
preceding National Maternity Benefit Scheme and to women seeking care in JSY districts 
outside of where they live. 
 
In columns (2) to (5) we present the reduced-form estimates of the effect of introducing 
the JSY on our main study outcomes from the second-stage equation. The coefficients in 
these models are interpreted as the effect of introducing the JSY into a district on the 
outcomes of interest, useful as a record of the programme’s impact during the period 
2005-2008. The result in column (2) shows a positive, significant effect of the JSY on 
births in a health facility. The estimate of 2.8 percentage points is small both in absolute 
terms and relative to the baseline mean of 39 percent. When we include demographic 
controls in column (3), the model is estimated with more precision and the point estimate 
increases slightly to 3 percentage points.  
 
Despite the increase in utilisation, columns (4) and (5) show that introducing the JSY had 
no effect on neonatal mortality. The direction of the effect is negative, as expected, but 
the coefficient estimates in both models are not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Our preferred estimate in column (5) implies that we are able to reject reductions 
in neonatal mortality due to the JSY of greater than 2.7 deaths per 1,000 live births. These 
preliminary findings cast doubt on the extent to which the JSY has been able to improve 






V. Main Results 
V.A Use of Health Care and Mortality 
Table 3 presents IV estimates of the effect of the JSY on the various measures of 
utilisation. We follow equation (1) in controlling for district and year fixed effects, 
district characteristics interacted with the year dummies and individual demographic 
characteristics. For each outcome we also present a baseline estimate from a model 
without individual demographic controls.  
 
Column (1) shows the results for health workers in attendance at delivery. The JSY at full 
coverage is associated with an 8 percentage point increase (from a baseline mean of 46 
percent) in the proportion of women who give birth with a health worker in attendance. 
Columns (2) and (3) show the effect of the JSY on health facility births. The point 
estimates indicate that the JSY at full coverage leads to a 12 percentage point increase in 
facility births and a 19 percentage point increase in public facility births. We discuss the 
difference between these two estimates below in relation to unintended consequences of 
the programme. Columns (4) to (6) present the effect of the JSY on utilisation by each 
type of public health facility. These results imply that the impact on public health facility 
births is driven largely by increases in births at community health centres and primary 
health centres. For example, the JSY at full coverage is associated with a 9 percentage 
point increase in births at primary health centres, relative to a baseline mean of 2.6 
percent. In contrast, district hospitals account for only a small proportion of the treatment 
effect. These findings suggest a large expansion in access to public health providers 
below the district hospital. 
 
Column (7) shows that there is no evidence the JSY had a substantial effect on utilisation 
of antenatal care services. The point estimate on the outcome indicating whether a woman 
received three or more antenatal care visits is small and statistically insignificant in the 
specification without demographic controls. This result holds irrespective of how we 
define the antenatal care outcome (result not shown).
22
 Inclusion of the demographics 
increases the point estimate and its significance marginally. This finding of little or no 
impact comes as no surprise given that the financial incentive in the JSY is not explicitly 
tied to the use of antenatal care. Indeed, antenatal care may be considered a placebo 
outcome with the result suggesting that the JSY treatment indicator is not simply acting 
as a proxy for other government policies aimed at strengthening maternal health services. 
In the Appendix, Table A2 shows that the JSY had no significant effect on the rate of 
caesarean sections and a small, positive effect on assisted deliveries, significantly 
different from zero at the 10 percent level.  
 
Taken together, the results on utilisation paint a consistent picture. The JSY had a 
positive effect on utilisation of maternity services – but little or no effect on antenatal 
care, a behaviour that was not explicitly incentivised. The impact of maternity services is 
greatest at lower levels of health provider, where only basic health services are available. 
                                                     
22 Alternative measures of antenatal care utilisation include the total number of antenatal care visits and the 
proportion of women who have at least one antenatal care visit in a health facility.  
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For example, at the first level of referral, only 18 percent of community health centres 
offer caesarean sections and less than 10 percent have blood storage facilities 
(International Institute for Population Sciences, 2010). This may explain why the results 
show no impact on the caesarean section rate, a procedure that requires a high level of 
technical ability and resources. 
 
We next turn to the mortality results presented in Table 4. IV estimates in column (1) 
show that the JSY had a negative, though statistically insignificant, effect on neonatal 
mortality. Our preferred point estimate indicates that we are able to rule out with 95 
percent confidence a negative effect of the JSY at full coverage on neonatal mortality 
larger than 10.4 deaths per 1,000 live births. In columns (2) to (4) we separate out 
neonatal mortality into its constituent parts. These definitions of mortality are far from 
standard. However, we anticipate that if the JSY were to reduce mortality, this effect 
would be strongest within the first 24 hours of childbirth when maternity care is provided. 
In column (2) we test for this possibility, with the results showing a stronger negative but 
still statistically insignificant effect of the JSY on mortality.
23
 Columns (3) and (4) 
confirm that there was no effect of the JSY on later neonatal mortality, which provides 
some confidence that the findings in column (2) are not spurious for we would not 
anticipate maternity care to have a direct effect on the mortality of the baby after the 
mother is discharged to go home. 
 
These findings give rise to the question why the increase in use of maternity services has 
not translated into improved health outcomes. One explanation points to limitations of 
quality of care. While we examine this hypothesis in more detail in Section VI and are 
reluctant to draw firm conclusions here, we note that the JSY increased access to 
maternity services at health facilities below the district hospital, which are less able to 
manage emergency complications at childbirth. It is also important to note that our 
mortality findings of no effect contradict those from the closest antecedent to this paper, 
which concluded that the financial incentives of the JSY were effective in reducing 
neonatal mortality (Lim et al., 2010).  
 
 
V.B Magnitudes and Simple Cost-Effectiveness 
The magnitudes of effects in our study can be gauged by using our reduced-form 
coefficient estimate from column (3) in Table 2 to examine what utilisation of maternity 
services would have been in a number of states with and without the JSY. The vast 
majority of districts in the state of Madhya Pradesh introduced the JSY early. If instead 
they had not started the programme, facility births would have been 7 percent lower than 
the level in 2007/08. No districts in the state of Punjab introduced the JSY during the 
study period but if they all had, facility births would have been 105 percent higher than 
the 2007/08 level. These magnitudes are clearly modest.  
 
                                                     
23 We can statistically rule out a reduction in mortality within the first 24 hours due to the JSY of larger than 
8.7 deaths per 1,000 live births. 
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According to our reduced-form estimates, the JSY encouraged an additional 580 thousand 
women in India to give birth in a health facility in 2007/08. In a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation using programme expenditure data, we estimate that the government spent 
$357 of JSY money for each additional facility birth.
24
 Because the financial incentive is 
given irrespective of whether the individual would have given birth in the health facility 
in the absence of the JSY, the cost per marginal visit is clearly high. Using data on the 
cost of delivery from Bonu et al (2009), we calculate a total cost of $486 for each 
additional facility birth.
25
 However, while a cost to the government, one could argue that 
the financial incentives should not be considered a cost at all since they represent a 
transfer of resources. The cost to society then is only the deadweight loss associated with 
taxation, the administrative cost of running the JSY and the cost of providing delivery 
care services. 
 
In contrast, our IV results suggest that the programme when implemented at full coverage 
would have incentivised around 2.1 million more women to give birth in a health facility. 
This comparison between the reduced form and the IV results – the difference between 
the effect of JSY placement and the effect of the financial incentives as the mechanism 
within the JSY – is revealing. It highlights what might be called an “implementation gap” 
and suggests an important opportunity to improve the effectiveness of the programme on 
utilisation. 
 
There is a growing literature on demand-side incentives in health against which to 
compare the magnitudes of our estimated effects, although few are specific to maternal 
health. Experimental evidence comes from studies of conditional cash transfers in Mexico 
(Fernald et al., 2008; Gertler, 2000; Gertler, 2004), Nicaragua (Maluccio and Flores, 
2005), Brazil (Morris et al., 2004b), Ecuador (Paxson and Schady, 2008) and Honduras 
(Morris et al., 2004a), one-off financial incentives in Malawi (Thornton, 2008), and non-
financial incentives in India (Banerjee et al., 2010). The interventions in these studies are 
targeted towards poor families and most provide some evidence of positive effects on 




In Malawi, a small-scale project was found to increase the percentage of individuals who 
collected their HIV test results by 44 percentage points (Thornton, 2008). Perhaps the 
most well-known CCT programme is Mexico’s Oportunidades, which was shown to 
increase health clinic consultations by 2.1 visits per day (Gertler, 2000). The CCT 
programme in Honduras increased utilisation of prenatal care by women, routine 
                                                     
24 This figure is likely to represent a minimum cost since we have not factored in administration of the JSY, 
whose economic cost is not captured by programme expenditures. If we assume conservatively administration 
costs represent 10 percent of programme spending, expenditure per additional facility birth is $393. 
25 Bonu and colleagues (2009) report estimates of household expenditure on delivery care from India’s 
National Sample Survey in 2004. We use household expenditure on a private facility birth on the basis that 
this better reflects the full economic cost of giving birth. Because the public sector is subsidised, expenditure 
on a public facility birth is likely to be a gross underestimate. While crude, our cost estimate gives a sense of 
the order of magnitude. Note that the financial data are adjusted for inflation.   
26 We report below effects that were shown to be significant but note that the studies also show evidence of 
no effect on numerous other utilization outcomes, which are summarized in a systematic review of CCT 
programmes by Lagarde and colleagues (2007). Robust causal estimates from nonexperimental studies 
include CCT programmes in Columbia (Attanasio et al., 2005), Turkey (Ahmed et al., 2007), and Chile 
(Galasso, 2007).   
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paediatric examinations and child growth monitoring by 19 percentage points, 20 
percentage points and 16 percentage points respectively (Morris et al., 2004a). A similar 
programme in Nicaragua increased utilisation of child preventive health visits by 11 
percentage points (Maluccio and Flores, 2005). No significant impact of CCTs on health 
visits was found in Ecuador (Paxson and Schady, 2008). Finally, in the Indian state of 
Rajasthan, lentils were offered alongside immunization camps, raising full immunization 
rates to 39 percent compared with 6 percent in control and 18 percent in immunization 
camp only villages (Banerjee et al., 2010). The evidence on financial incentives in health 
is limited almost exclusively to the use of simple health technologies. More complex 
health services, whose quality of care is more difficult for patients to assess, have rarely 
been targeted with demand-side financial incentives. 
 
 
V.C Unintended Consequences 
Our results thus far have focused on outcomes the JSY was intended to improve. 
However, high powered incentives have the potential to influence a broad range of 
behaviours, which in turn may have both positive and negative implications for welfare. 
Here we study three possible effects of such incentives.  
 
First, economic theory predicts that reducing the price of the health services in the public 
sector using financial incentives will increase demand through a substitution effect. In 
other words, we expect the JSY to increase demand for public maternity services, in part, 
through a substitution away from private health providers. Second, some have argued that 
cash payments for delivery or child health care provide an incentive to become pregnant. 
Experimental findings from a study of conditional cash transfers in Honduras suggest that 
the intervention increased fertility (Morris et al., 2004a; Stecklov et al., 2006). Third, 
financial incentives for delivery care may have positive benefits through changes in 
health-related behaviours subsequent to childbirth, such as breastfeeding. The idea is that 
women who give birth in a health facility are more likely to be exposed to information on 




We investigate the causal link between the JSY and two of the outcomes – private health 
care seeking and breastfeeding behaviour –using the same econometric specification as 
previous. In the analysis of fertility, we modify the approach to take advantage of the 
opportunity to include individual- rather than district-level fixed effects. To do so, we use 
data on the birth histories from the DLHS-3 only. More formally, we run panel 
regressions of the form, 
 
                                         ,   (3) 
 
                                                     
27 We also considered other health-related behaviours potentially influenced by exposure to information 
during childbirth, including postnatal care seeking, whether the baby was immediately wiped dry and 
wrapped, and whether a sterilized blade was used to cut the umbilical cord. The DLHS, however, provides no 
scope for measuring these outcomes consistently between the two survey rounds. Child immunization was not 
regarded as a plausible indirect outcome given the long time lag between childbirth and vaccinations.  
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where      is the probability of being pregnant,    is an individual fixed effect, and the 
term       represents interactions between year dummies and a vector of individual 
demographic characteristics, measured at the time of interview. Inclusion of the 
individual fixed effects allows us to control for unobserved, time-invariant factors that 
affect fertility at the individual level. We continue to instrument for       with the 
indicator for whether the district introduced the programme. The unit of observation is a 
woman-year and because we are using only the DLHS-3 we have one year instead of four 
years of pre-JSY data. 
 
Before turning to estimation, we note that the policymakers anticipated some of these 
unintended consequences in the design of the JSY. By limiting the cash payment to 
women with two or fewer children in the low focus states, partial safeguards were in 
place to mitigate the risk of incentivising pregnancy. The intention was also to expand 
implementation of the JSY into the private sector through an accreditation process, 
thereby limiting incentives for substitution between health providers. Despite good 
intentions, these policy measures were either inadequate or not implemented, as we 
discuss below.  
 
Table 5 presents the results on unintended consequences of the JSY. Column (1) shows 
that the JSY at full coverage reduced utilisation of the maternity services in the private 
sector by 7.2 percentage points. For reference, we reproduce in column (2) previous 
findings on utilisation of services in the public sector. Substitution away from the private 
sector thus accounts for more than one-third of the effect of the JSY on public facility 
births. Descriptive statistics from the DLHS data lend support to these findings by 
showing that the JSY has been predominantly a public sector programme despite the 
stated policy to involve private health providers. Only 6 percent of women giving birth in 
a private health facility in JSY districts received the financial incentive, compared with 
34 percent in the public sector.
28
 Moreover, only 10 percent of JSY beneficiaries 
nationwide gave birth in a private health facility. The mortality results suggest that this 
substitution between providers is unlikely to have had any detrimental effect on mortality 
but it may have led to a reduction in household expenditure on health care and, in turn, an 




We next look at the fertility results. For women who report being pregnant at the time of 
interview, we have no information on when they became pregnant to assign the 
pregnancy to a specific year. We therefore report two sets of results, based on alternative 
assumptions to construct the outcome measure. In column (3), we assume that women are 
six months pregnant if pregnant at the time of interview and find that the JSY increases 
the likelihood of pregnancy by 1.1 percentage points. A second, more appealing, 
approach is to use a random number generator, constrained between three and nine, to 
determine the number of months a woman is pregnant, if pregnant at the time of 
                                                     
28 This comes as no surprise given the need for private health providers to go through a process of 
accreditation if they are to participate in the JSY programme. 
29 The literature on the household cost of health care at childbirth provides consistent evidence that 
expenditures on maternity services in the private sector far exceed those in the public sector  (Bonu et al., 
2009; Borghi et al., 2006; Powell-Jackson and Hoque, 2011). 
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interview. The result, in column (4), shows a stronger effect on pregnancy with a point 
estimate of 1.7 percentage points.
 30
 This, our preferred estimate, is large given the 




From these results it is not possible to say whether the effect of financial incentives on 
pregnancy reflects an increase in the total lifetime number of children a woman has or a 
reduction in birth spacing. Either way, it represents an unintended consequence and raises 
several concerns. First, the JSY appears to be acting against government population 
policy. Second, the JSY may be counterproductive to its own objectives – birth spacing 
and total fertility are important underlying causes of maternal and neonatal mortality (Zhu 
et al., 1999). 
 
This finding may take on less meaning if the increase in the likelihood of pregnancy 
reflects a short-lived, transitory effect of introducing the JSY. We test for this possibility 
in the reduced form equation by including interactions between JSY introduction and two 
dummies measuring the number of years the JSY has been active in a district at time   
(we omit the first year in which the JSY is introduced). The pattern of the coefficient 
estimates show that, if anything, the positive effect of the JSY on fertility increased as the 
programme matured.
32
 The effect on fertility therefore cannot be written off as a 
temporary phenomenon; the evidence suggests it is a more permanent feature of the 
programme. 
 
The risk of increased fertility was partly anticipated by policymakers in the design of the 
JSY and these safeguards provide some motivation to scrutinise the validity of the 
fertility results. If women with more than two children were unable to receive the JSY 
cash, why would they be incentivised to become pregnant? However, the policy of 
limiting the cash payment to women with two or fewer children applied only to the low 
focus states and was difficult to implement. DLHS-3 data show that the probability of a 
woman receiving the cash incentive after giving birth in a public health facility is 
statistically the same across parity groups, a pattern which suggests policy attempts to 
mitigate this unintended consequence provide no reason for questioning the validity of 
the fertility results.
 33
   
 
                                                     
30 In a bounds check we estimate the effect of the JSY on fertility, taking extreme values for the number of 
months a woman is pregnant, if pregnant at the time of interview. When we assume nine months, we find that 
the JSY led to a 1.0 percentage point (standard error 0.0089) increase in the likelihood of becoming pregnant, 
our most conservative estimate. If we assume three months, the fixed effect regression gives a point estimate 
of 2.7 percentage points (standard error 0.0065). 
31 A third approach might seek to model seasonality in pregnancy. The data, however, show that the 
probability of pregnancy differs little across months of the year. 
32 The reduced form coefficient estimates indicate that the JSY had an additional effect on fertility of 0.2 
percentage points (standard error 0.001) in the second year since introduction and 0.9 percentage points 
(standard error (0.003) in the third year introduction. While these results may be driven by greater coverage 
of the JSY in the second and third year of implementation, they provide little support for the argument that 
the effect on fertility is transitory.  
33 The percentage of women in JSY districts who received the cash incentive conditional on giving birth in a 
public health facility is as follows: first birth (33.0 percent); second birth (32.5 percent), third birth (29.1 
percent); fourth birth (33.4 percent); and fifth or higher birth (35.5 percent). While these data are not perfect – 
the number of times a woman has given birth does not necessarily equal the number of living children – they 
are highly suggestive of the policy not being effective in practice. 
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Columns (5) and (6) of Table 5 report the results on breastfeeding within the first hour 
and the first 24 hours of birth respectively. The point estimate in column (5) is a 
statistically significant 7.4 percentage points, suggesting that the JSY increased 
breastfeeding in the first hour. The result in column (6) shows that when we lengthen the 
time period to cover breastfeeding within the first 24 hours of birth, the effect of the JSY 
dissipates. We therefore conjecture that the positive effect on breastfeeding reflects 
increased exposure to information from health workers around the time of childbirth. 
While these findings on breastfeeding concern just one behaviour, they highlight the 
potential for financial incentives to have positive benefits on other, non-incentivised 




Our estimates of effect have a causal interpretation in so far as our identifying assumption 
holds that placement of the JSY is orthogonal to the error term after controlling for 
district level determinants. While it is by definition impossible to formally test this 
assumption, we can mitigate concerns of bias due to non-random placement of the JSY 
by pursuing several robustness checks. Before we do so, we reiterate the result that shows 
the JSY had little or no effect on utilisation of antenatal care – which we interpret as 
evidence supporting the notion that JSY placement is not simply acting as a proxy for 
other closely-related health policies.   
 
First, we examine whether introduction of the JSY next year is associated with the study 
outcomes. If unobservables are driving both the introduction of the JSY and changes in 
outcomes, we may expect evidence of pre-existing trends (so long as these unobservables 
change slowly over time). A visual inspection of trends offers one approach to assessing 
pre-existing trends. Figure A3 in the Appendix shows little sign of divergent trends 
between the intervention and comparison districts before the JSY was introduced for any 
of the study outcomes.
34
 To conduct a more formal test for whether trends in outcomes 
anticipate the introduction of the JSY, we include in the reduced form equations an 




Table 6 presents the results of this specification check for each of the study outcomes. 
With the exception of breastfeeding, the coefficient on the dummy indicating the 
introduction of the JSY next year is small, insignificant and, where expected, statistically 
different from the effect of the JSY this year. Introducing the JSY next year does not 
predict changes in these study outcomes, suggesting that the JSY dummy is not merely 
capturing the continuation of pre-existing trends. There is, however, evidence that 
changes in breastfeeding anticipate the introduction of the JSY and we must be cautious 
in interpreting the breastfeeding results as causal.  
 
                                                     
34 While these graphs are informative with respect to the possibility of confounding trends (before the JSY 
was introduced), they are less helpful in providing visual evidence of impacts. Our reduced-form estimates of 
effect are typically too small to make meaningful conclusions from an inspection of trends.   
35 Because we have no information on whether the 163 non JSY districts introduced the JSY in 2008/09, the 
year following the end of our study period, we drop all 2007/08 observations in this robustness check.  
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Second, we examine whether the within-district variation over time in the coverage of the 
JSY that identifies the effect of the programme is correlated with the demographic 
characteristics of individuals. Following Gentkzow and Shapiro (2008), we generate a 
predicted value of JSY coverage for each individual using the first stage model, equation 
(1) but without controls for individuals characteristics, and then regress this variable on 
the full set of individual-level demographic controls.  
 
Table 7 presents in column (1) the results of this robustness check. Column (2) shows the 
results when we do not control for district-level poverty, tribal population and wealth, and 
column (3) shows the relationship between the demographic characteristics and our main 
utilisation outcome, births in a health facility. The results in column (1) show that the 
demographic controls are not strongly correlated with predicted JSY coverage. The 
coefficient estimates in all cases are small and statistically insignificant at the 5 percent 
level. They suggest that once we control for district level characteristics, the remaining 
variation is largely idiosyncratic. In contrast, when we fail to include district poverty, 
tribal population and wealth, some of the coefficients on the demographic characteristics 
become highly significant (column 2). These results are all the more convincing in view 





Third, we examine the extent to which the results are sensitive to our definition of JSY 
introduction. Recall that we defined the year the JSY was introduced in a given district to 
be the first year in which the proportion of women giving birth in a public health facility 
who received a cash payment is 10 percentage points greater than the 2004/05 level. We 
experiment with a 20 percentage point and 5 percentage point increment. Table A3 in the 
Appendix reports IV estimates using our preferred model that controls for individual 
demographics. As shown in columns (2) and (3), the results are qualitatively similar for 
each outcome. The magnitudes and statistical significance of the estimated effects are 
broadly consistent across different definitions of JSY introduction.   
                                                     
36 The fertility results raise the possibility of systematic differences emerging between JSY and non JSY 
districts in the characteristics of women who give birth. These differences could lead to bias in estimated 
treatment effects for our utilisation and mortality outcomes. Note that this potential problem would arise even 
if placement of the JSY were randomised. The specification checks in Table 7 account for this possibility.  
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VI. Heterogeneity in Impacts 
In this section we go beyond average effects to investigate the extent to which the impact 
of the JSY varies along relevant dimensions. Understanding heterogeneity in the effect of 
the JSY is likely to be of interest to policymakers concerned with equity. It can also shed 
light on how financial incentives work to improve care seeking behaviour and health 
status.  
 
We begin by examining how the effect of the JSY is distributed along several standard 
dimensions of socioeconomic status. These can be considered demand-side factors that 
may modify the effect of the JSY on health care seeking behaviour. To study 
heterogeneity in the effect of the JSY with respect to socioeconomic status, we use our 
same instrumental variable approach on subsamples of women that are divided according 
to categories of mother’s education, ethnicity and household wealth. All categories are 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Education is split into women with no 
education and those with some education. Women are separated into two quantiles 
according to the household wealth asset score. Ethnicity is divided into two categories: 
women belonging to scheduled castes, scheduled tribes or other “backward ethnic 
groups” and women who belong to none of these groups.37  
 
Table 8 presents the JSY treatment effects across various subsamples with public facility 
births as the dependent variable. The first two columns show that the effect of the JSY at 
full coverage on utilisation is greater amongst women with no education (21 percentage 
points) than women with some education (16 percentage points). In terms of relative 
impacts, this difference is considerable. The next two columns compare the treatment 
effect between the two wealth groups, with point estimates showing a similar pattern to 
the education results. Poorer women are more likely to give birth in a public health 
facility in response to the JSY than richer women. The results in columns (5) and (6) 
again document a similar pattern with respect to ethnicity of the household. The JSY 
increases utilisation amongst women belonging to marginalised ethnicities by 19 
percentage points, while the treatment effect is 15 percentage points for nonmarginalised 
women. There is a consistent pattern across the results demonstrating that the behavioural 
response to the financial incentives of the JSY is greater amongst women who are more 
disadvantaged. The findings imply that the JSY contributed to greater equity in access to 
maternity services.  
 
In the final two columns of Table 8 we run separate regressions for districts considered 
by the JSY programme as high-priority and those considered low-priority districts.
38
 The 
effect of the JSY is therefore identified using district variation in the introduction of the 
programme within each subsample of districts. Results show that the JSY increased 
public facility births in the high focus districts by 21 percentage points. In contrast, the 
                                                     
37 Here we have used the exact language of the various ethnic categories given in the DLHS questionnaires.  
38 The high focus states are also called low-performing states in JSY policy documents in reference to the fact 
that a low proportion of women give birth in health facilities. They include Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, 
Orissa, Utta Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Assam and Jammu and Kashmir). 
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point estimate is statistically insignificant in the low priority districts, indicating no strong 
behavioural response to the financial incentives in these areas of India. While it is 
difficult to unpack with certainty the reasons behind this finding, we note that the 
financial package was more generous in the high priority states.  
 
These findings also speak to the robustness of the our main results for the effect of the 
JSY in the high-priority districts is remarkably close to that reported in column (3) of 
Table 3. They imply that when we restrict the analysis to a subsample of districts whose 
characteristics are much more similar, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates remains 
almost unchanged. In other words, we can be more confident that the comparison districts 
in the analysis of the full sample provide an appropriate counterfactual.  
    
We next examine heterogeneity in the effect of the JSY on mortality with respect to the 
structural quality of care of health care providers (Donabedian, 1966). As discussed 
previously, whether greater access to maternity services translates into health 
improvements depends on the supply-side. It is this hypothesis we wish to test for in the 
following analysis. Using data from a survey of public health providers that was 
conducted in parallel with the DLHS-3, we develop a quality of care index for the district 
hospital, community health care centres and primary health centres. Our measure of 
structural quality of care is made up of six components: 24 hour service availability; 
staffing; training of staff; basic infrastructure; equipment; and drugs. Within each 
category there are a number of binary indicators that relate to specific questions on the 
availability of inputs. We compute the share of inputs that are available in each category 
and then take an unweighted average across all the categories. The quality of care index is 
normalised to have mean zero and standard deviation one, then aggregated at the district 
level because we are unable to link specific health facilities to administrative areas within 
a district. 
 
The econometric analysis proceeds on the basis of the following model: 
 
                                                  , (4) 
 
where   is an index of quality of care for one of three types of public health provider. 
We interact the JSY introduction dummy with the demographic controls and use this 
vector to instrument for both       and the interaction term           . If the JSY leads 
to a greater improvement in mortality in districts where quality of care is higher, we 
would expect the coefficient on the term            to be negative.  
 
Table 9 reports the results from estimations of equation (4). The left hand side variable in 
column (1) is mortality within the first 24 hours of birth and the quality of care index in 
the interaction term refers to primary health centres. The coefficient on the interaction 
between JSY coverage and quality of care is negative, in keeping with expectations. Its 
estimate implies that a one standard deviation increase in the quality of care index 
reduces the marginal effect of the JSY at full coverage on mortality by 3 deaths per 1,000 




Column (2) repeats the specification in column (1), replacing quality of care at primary 
health centres with quality of care at community health centres in the interaction term. 
Again the coefficient on quality of care interacted with JSY coverage is negative and 
insignificant. Finally, we see a similar pattern in column (3) when we use the district 
hospital index as our measure of structural quality of care.  
 
To summarize, we find no evidence to suggest that the JSY led to greater improvements 
in mortality in districts with better quality of care. In other words, the average treatment 
effect on mortality does not appear to mask important differences with respect to quality 
of care. The absence of a differential effect of the JSY according to our proxy for quality 
of care is surprising and we do not have a definitive answer. One potential explanation is 
that our measures of mortality and quality of care are simply not appropriate in this 
particular context. One could argue that maternal mortality should be the outcome of 
interest. While there is some merit to this argument, we might reasonably expect an effect 
on early neonatal deaths. Almost 50 percent of neonatal deaths in our sample occur within 
the first 24 hours when medical intervention at childbirth has the potential to be effective. 




A second and, in our view, more persuasive explanation is that the JSY incentivises 
women predominantly to health facilities whose purpose is not to manage life-threatening 
complications. However good the quality of care in health institutions below the district 
hospital, it may remain inadequate to save the lives of women and their baby, particularly 
when obstetric emergencies require intensive rather than obstetric care (Costello et al., 
2006). Having a fully functional referral system is thus critical for the success of any 
intervention which seeks to increase access to institutional delivery care, as argued by 





                                                     
39 With some notable exceptions (Das and Hammer, 2006), it is not uncommon for quality of care to be 




In this paper, we have examined the causal link between one of the world’s largest 
demand-side financial incentive programmes and health-related outcomes in India. 
Consistent with much of the literature, we find that the financial incentives in the JSY are 
effective in increasing use of formal health services, particularly at lower levels of the 
public health system. However, there is an implementation gap. Because of incomplete 
coverage of the JSY, the increase in use of formal maternal health care due to the 
programme has been modest. Our findings on neonatal mortality show no effect, 
suggesting that recent evidence on the JSY may require reassessment.  
 
We have argued that high powered incentives have the potential to influence a broad 
range of behaviours, intended or otherwise. Any evaluation of financial incentives should 
go beyond the narrow objectives of the programme to examine potential unintended 
consequences. Our fertility results are particularly striking because they suggest a 
pathway through which the programme’s own objective of reducing maternal and 
neonatal mortality may be undermined. It also serves to demonstrate the importance of 
anticipating such risks in the programme design and, in turn, ensuring appropriate 
measures are put into practice.  
 
A further point of discussion relates to the generalisability of our findings to an expanded 
JSY programme, say five years down the line. One possibility is that the effects in this 
paper may be larger than those observed when the JSY finally reaches all districts in 
India. Early introduction of the JSY was understandably prioritised in districts that 
contain poorer and predominantly tribal populations and evidence on impact 
heterogeneity suggests that these districts were the ones where the greatest benefits from 
the programme could be realised.  Thus, extending our estimates of effect to districts that 
since 2008 have introduced the JSY may not provide a good approximation to the true 
impact of the financial incentives in these districts.  
 
The collective evidence in this paper, on both intended and unintended effects, points 
towards the need for policymakers to be cautious in the use of financial incentives. For 
example, even though it is self-evident that the supply-side must be in place if demand-
side financial incentives are to work, there is a proliferation of schemes in countries 
where the quality and even availability of care is vastly inadequate. Future research on 
this topic should broaden its scope to address questions around the ethics and 
acceptability of financial incentives, their long-term effects, and the potential harms 

















Panel A. Study outcomes 
Neonatal mortality 0.0300 0.170 429,514 
Health worker in attendance at delivery 0.476 0.499 344,925 
Delivery in a health facility 0.412 0.492 344,925 
Public health provider 0.228 0.419 344,925 
Private health provider 0.185 0.388 344,925 
Caesarean section 0.0768 0.266 344,904 
Assisted delivery 0.0222 0.147 344,904 
Three or more antenatal care visits 0.452 0.498 342,301 
Breastfeeding within one hour 0.356 0.479 336,288 








Panel B. Demographic variables 
Urban 0.221 0.415 344,925 
Hindu 0.761 0.426 344,925 
Scheduled caste 0.187 0.390 344,925 
Scheduled tribe 0.172 0.377 344,925 
Other backward caste / tribe 0.403 0.490 344,925 
Maternal age (years) 24.79 5.300 344,925 
Number of live births 2.589 1.404 344,925 
Woman’s education (grades completed) 4.410 4.893 344,925 
Husband’s education (grades completed) 6.648 5.037 344,925 
Household wealth asset score -0.0380 1.970 344,925 
 
Notes: Summary statistics are based on data from the DLHS-2 and DLHS-3, including only observations over 
the period 2001/02 – 2007/08. The unit of observation is a woman’s most recent delivery, except in the 
case of neonatal mortality (live birth) and pregnant this year (woman-year). Assisted delivery includes the use 
of forceps or a ventouse. The household asset wealth score is generated by applying principal component 




Reduced-Form Estimates of the Effect of JSY on Health Care Use and Neonatal Mortality 
Dependent variable: 
JSY coverage Delivery in a health facility 
 
Neonatal mortality  
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) 
JSY introduced in district 0.26*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 
 
-0.00028 -0.00038 
 (0.010) (0.0057) (0.0051) 
 
(0.0012) (0.0012) 
District and year fixed effects YES YES YES 
 
YES YES 
District demographics × year YES YES YES  YES YES 
Demographics NO NO YES  NO YES 
Mean of dependent variable at baseline 0.048 0.394 0.394  0.0307 0.0307 
 [0.107] [0.489] [0.489]  [0.173] [0.173] 
F(1, 586 ) stat on instrument 635.91 24.01 33.88  0.06 0.11 
p value (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.8103) (0.7416) 
Number of observations 344,923 344,923 344,923  429,445 429,445 
Number of districts 587 587 587  587 587 
 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in 
parentheses. Standard deviation of the dependent variable mean is in square brackets. JSY coverage is the proportion of women giving birth in a public health facility who received the cash 
incentive. District demographics include controls for share of population below the poverty line, the tribal population share, and the mean wealth asset score. Demographics include controls for 
mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, ethnicity and number of live births. The unit of 






2SLS Estimates of the Effect of JSY on Use of Maternal Health Care Services 
Dependent variable: 
Health worker in 
attendance at delivery 
Delivery in a 
health facility 
Delivery in public 
health facility 







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Effect of JSY at full coverage 
Baseline model 0.074*** 0.11*** 0.19*** 0.032** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.033 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.0097) (0.0088) (0.022) 
Baseline model + demographics 0.081*** 0.12*** 0.19*** 0.033** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.039* 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.0096) (0.0087) (0.020) 
Mean of dep. variable at baseline 0.463 0.394 0.197 0.135 0.0214 0.0262 0.445 
 [0.499] [0.489] [0.398] [0.342] [0.145] [0.160] [0.470] 
Number of observations 344,903 344,923 344,923 344,923 344,923 344,923 342,229 
Number of districts 587 587 587 587 587 587 587 
 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. Estimates are from instrumental variable models in which the introduction of the JSY is used to instrument for JSY coverage. *** denotes 
significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Standard deviation of the dependent variable mean is in 
square brackets. Health worker is in attendance if the birth is in a health facility or at home with a doctor, nurse, midwife, or lady health volunteer. Baseline model includes fixed effects for district 
and year of birth, and interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and mean wealth asset score. Demographics include 
controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, ethnicity and number of live births. The unit 






2SLS Estimates of the Effect of JSY on Neonatal Mortality 
Dependent variable: 
Neonatal mortality 
Disaggregated measures of mortality 
Death within 24 hours Death between 2 and 28 days Death between 8 and 28 days 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Effect of JSY at full coverage 
Baseline model -0.0011 -0.0025 0.0014 0.00055 
 (0.0046) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0018) 
Baseline model + demographics -0.0015 -0.0027 0.0012 0.00051 
 (0.0046) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0018) 
Mean of dep. variable at baseline 0.0307 0.0151 0.0156 0.0059 
 [0.173] [0.122] [0.124] [0.076] 
Number of observations 429,445 429,445 429,445 429,445 
Number of districts 587 587 587 587 
 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. Estimates are from instrumental variable models in which the introduction of the JSY is used to instrument for JSY coverage. *** denotes 
significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Standard deviation of the dependent variable mean is 
in square brackets. Baseline model includes fixed effects for district and year of birth and interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal 
population share, and mean wealth asset score. Demographics include controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, and dummies for 





2SLS Estimates of the Effect of JSY on Unintended Outcomes 
Dependent variable 
Place of delivery 
Pregnant 
(2004 – 2008) 
Pregnant 




Public health  
facility 
Within 1 hour Within 24 hours 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Effect of JSY at full coverage -0.072*** 0.19*** 0.011* 0.017*** 0.074** 0.0063 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.0062) (0.0057) (0.030) (0.037) 
Individual fixed effects NO NO YES YES NO NO 
District fixed effects YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
District demographics × year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Demographics YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Demographics × year NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Mean of dep. variable at baseline 0.197 0.197 0.087 0.088 0.321 0.553 
 [0.398] [0.398] [0.282] [0.283] [0.468] [0.497] 
Number of observations 344,923 344,923 2,528,498 2,528,498 336,286 336,286 
Number of districts 587 587 587 587 587 587 
 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3, except columns (3) and (4) which use pregnancy data constructed from the birth history of women in the DLHS-3 only. Estimates are from 
instrumental variable models in which the district introduction of the JSY is used to instrument for JSY coverage. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, 
corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Standard deviation of the dependent variable mean is in square brackets. Column (3) assumes that women reporting 
being pregnant at the time of interview are six months pregnant. Column (4) assumes that the number of months a woman has been pregnant, if pregnant at the time of interview, is as good as 
random (constrained to be between three and nine months). District demographics include the share of district population below the poverty line, the tribal population share, and district wealth 
asset score. Demographics include controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, 




Reduced-Form Estimates of the Effect of Future JSY on Study Outcomes 
Dependent variable: 
Health worker in 
attendance at delivery 




(2004 – 2008) 
Breastfeeding within 
 1 hour 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Effect of JSY introduction 
JSY introduced in district 0.018*** 0.023*** -0.00059 0.0064*** 0.014* 
 (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0079) 
JSY introduced next year -0.0040 0.0015 0.00039 -0.0017 0.018** 
 (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0080) 
Number of observations 277,541 277,556 361,984 1,896,387 270,378 
Number of districts 587 587 587 587 587 
 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in 
parentheses. Standard deviation of the dependent variable mean is in square brackets. Column (4) assumes that the number of months a woman has been pregnant, if pregnant at the time of 
interview, is as good as random (constrained to be between three and nine months). Regressions include fixed effects for district and year of birth, interactions between year of birth and district 
share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and mean wealth asset score, and a set of demographics that control for mother’s education, husband’s education, 
mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, ethnicity and number of live births. The unit of observation is a delivery (most recent only) in 











Delivery in a 
health facility 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Urban 0.00079 0.0016 0.11*** 
 (0.00054) (0.0012) (0.0046) 
Hindu -0.00039 0.00034 0.022*** 
 (0.00065) (0.0013) (0.0045) 
Scheduled caste  0.00035 -0.0012 -0.044*** 
 (0.00065) (0.0011) (0.0040) 
Scheduled tribe  0.0012 0.0045** -0.10*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0062) 
“Other backward” ethnicity 0.000076 -0.00038 -0.031*** 
 (0.00073) (0.0012) (0.0036) 
Woman’s education (grades completed) -0.000085* -0.00027*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000046) (0.000090) (0.00030) 
Husband’s education (grades completed) -0.000031 0.000060 0.0052*** 
 (0.000036) (0.000073) (0.00022) 
Two live births 0.00032 0.0010 -0.11*** 
 (0.00037) (0.00071) (0.0027) 
Three live births -0.00033 -0.00018 -0.16*** 
 (0.00047) (0.00099) (0.0034) 
Four live births 0.00044 -0.00036 -0.19*** 
 (0.00057) (0.0012) (0.0040) 
Five or more live births 0.00080 -0.00048 -0.23*** 
 (0.00083) (0.0017) (0.0045) 
Mother’s age at childbirth (years) -0.000096* -0.00011 0.0065*** 
 (0.000053) (0.00011) (0.00024) 
Wealth asset score 0.00017 -0.00026 0.038*** 
 (0.00013) (0.00025) (0.00088) 
F (13, 586) 1.57 2.59 1045.68 
p-value (0.0881) (0.0017) (<0.0001) 
Number of observations 344,923 344,923 344,923 
Number of districts 587 587 587 
R-squared 0.853 0.598 0.199 
 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% 
level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Standard 
deviation of the dependent variable mean is in square brackets. Columns (1) and (3) includes fixed effects for 
district and year of birth, and interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the 
poverty line, tribal population share, and mean wealth asset score. The model in column (2) is the same as 




Heterogeneity in the Effect of the JSY on Use of Maternal Health Care Services 
Dependent variable:  public health facility 
births 











caste or tribe  
High focus Low focus 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Effect of JSY at full coverage 
Baseline model 0.21*** 0.16***  0.22*** 0.15***  0.19*** 0.15***  0.21*** 0.060 
 (0.021) (0.025)  (0.023) (0.026)  (0.023) (0.027)  (0.023) (0.048) 
Baseline model + demographics 0.22*** 0.16***  0.22*** 0.15***  0.19*** 0.16***  0.22*** 0.068 
 (0.021) (0.025)  (0.022) (0.026)  (0.022) (0.026)  (0.022) (0.047) 
Mean of dependent variable at baseline 0.116 0.271  0.119 0.273  0.183 0.239  0.154 0.278 
 [0.320] [0.445]  [0.323] [0.446]  [0.387] [0.426]  [0.361] [0.448] 
Number of observations 163, 041 181, 879  175,704 169,263  262, 714 82, 202  234,825 110,098 
Number of districts 580 587  585 587  587 577  343 244 
 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. Estimates are from instrumental variable models in which the introduction of the JSY is used to instrument for JSY coverage. *** 
denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Standard deviation of the dependent 
variable mean is in square brackets. Baseline model includes fixed effects for district and year of birth, and interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the 
poverty line, tribal population share, and mean wealth asset score. Demographics include controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, and 
dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, ethnicity and number of live births. The demographic variable on which the sample is divided is excluded. The unit of observation is a 





Quality of Care and the Effect of the JSY on Health Outcomes 
Dependent variable: death within 
24 hours 
Primary health 
centre quality of 
care index 
Community health 
centre quality of 
care index 
District hospital 
quality of care 
index 
(1) (2) (3) 
JSY coverage -0.0029 -0.0048 -0.0030 
 (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0033) 
JSY coverage × Quality of care -0.0030 -0.0052 -0.0057 
 (0.0079) (0.011) (0.012) 
Mean of dep. variable at baseline 0.0152 0.0154 0.0152 
 [0.123] [0.123] [0.122] 
Number of observations 422,639 394,120 406, 006 
Number of districts 572 544 551 
 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. Estimates are from instrumental variable models in which 
interactions between district introduction of the JSY and demographic characteristics are used to instrument for the 
term (                    in equation (4). *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. 
Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Standard deviation of the 
dependent variable mean is in square brackets. Regression models includes fixed effects for district and year of 
birth, interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal 
population share, and mean wealth asset score, and a set of demographics that control for mother’s education, 
husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, 
religion, ethnicity, number of live births and a twin birth. The unit of observation is a live birth (based on the four-
year recall birth history of a woman). Deviations in sample size are due to missing data on quality of care across 


































Notes: Data are from the DLHS-3. Introduction and coverage data refer to the period 1st April 2005 to 31st March 2008, with years denominated in financial years. JSY coverage is defined as the 
proportion of women giving birth in a public health facility who received a financial incentive after childbirth. Black (white) lines denote state (district) administrative boundaries. Regions not 
shown on the map are due to missing data. The maps do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the authors on the legal status of any territory.
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Appendix Table 1 
Correlates of JSY Placement 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average asset wealth score -0.099*** -0.088*** -0.068*** -0.00061 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) 
Poor share of population  0.21*** 0.19*** 0.31*** 
  (0.067) (0.066) (0.10) 
Tribal share of population   0.30*** 0.43*** 
   (0.063) (0.098) 
Number of observations 1,761 1,761 1,761 587 
 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-3. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. The unit of observation, except in column 4, is a district-year over the 
period 2005/06 - 2007/08. Independent variables are measured at the time of interview in 2007/08.  
 
Appendix Table 2 
Estimates of the Effect of JSY on Medical Procedures at 
Childbirth 
Dependent variable: Caesarean section Assisted delivery 
 (1) (2) 
Effect of JSY at full coverage 
Baseline model -0.00079 0.014* 
 (0.0086) (0.0076) 
Baseline model + demographics 0.0023 0.015* 
 (0.0085) (0.0076) 
Mean of dependent variable at baseline 0.0758 0.0236 
 [0.265] [0.152] 
Number of observations 344,902 344,902 
Number of districts 587 587 
 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. Estimates are from instrumental variable models in which 
the introduction of the JSY is used to instrument for JSY coverage. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, 
and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. 
Standard deviation of the dependent variable mean is in square brackets. Assisted delivery involves the use of 
forceps or a ventouse. Baseline model includes fixed effects for district and year of birth, and interactions 
between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and 
mean wealth asset score. Demographics include controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s 
age at birth, wealth asset score, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, ethnicity and number of 




Appendix Table 3 
Robustness to Definition of JSY Introduction 
 
Percentage point increase in coverage over the 2004 level 
used to define introduction of the JSY 
 
10 % 20% 5% 
(1) (2) (3) 
Health worker in attendance at delivery 0.081*** 0.13*** 0.056*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) 
Delivery in a health facility 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.096*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) 
Delivery in a public health facility 0.19*** 0.28*** 0.17*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) 
Delivery in a private health facility -0.072*** -0.092*** -0.070*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) 
Three or more antenatal care visits 0.039* 0.032* 0.040* 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) 
Neonatal mortality -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0056 
 (0.0046) (0.0042) (0.0051) 
Death within 24 hours -0.0027 -0.0015 -0.0041 
 (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0035) 
Pregnant (2004-2008) 0.017*** 0015** 0.014** 
 (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0062) 
Breastfeeding within 1 hour 0.074** 0.094*** 0.065* 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.034) 
 
Notes: This table presents estimates of the effect of the JSY for each of the study outcomes using three alternative 
measures of JSY introduction. Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3, except for pregnancy which uses 
pregnancy data constructed from the birth history of women in the DLHS-3 only. Estimates are from instrumental 
variable models in which the district introduction of the JSY is used to instrument for JSY coverage. *** denotes 
significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are 
reported in parentheses. To construct our measure of pregnancy we assume that the number of months a woman 
has been pregnant, if pregnant at the time of interview, is as good as random (constrained to be between three and 
nine months). Regression models includes fixed effects for district and year of birth, interactions between year of 
birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and mean wealth asset 
score, and a set of demographics that control for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, 







Appendix Figure 1 
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